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"God can turn it around for you" 
Oral Roberts 
"America, you must be born again...your whole structure 
must be changed." 
Martin Luther King, Jr. 
"We need a liberation theology that will draw on the folk piety of 
Baptists, Methodists, and the rest." At least this possibility has been 
suggested by Harvey Cox, an influential Protestant theologian and social 
critic.1 But how should we assess this idea? Is it plausible to speculate 
that mainstream evangelical popular religion in the United States might 
take a form, either now or in the future, that opposes the society's and 
culture's dominant power structures, and upholds the interests of poor 
people and others who are excluded from power? Can we imagine an 
evangelical religious-social movement analogous to liberation theologies, 
the diverse but interrelated set of radical interpretations of Christianity 
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developed since the 1960s by third world Christians, feminists, African 
Americans and others?2 
This essay considers these questions in the light of postmodern popu-
lar culture theory. In recent years there has been a surge of scholarly 
interest in studying secular popular culture as a site of cultural-political 
contestation. Cultural critics have produced a large literature on cultural 
theory and many important studies of topics such as popular music, film 
and television. Frequently these studies have drawn on poststructuralist 
cultural criticism, which highlights how what we experience as "reality" is 
constituted through cultural texts, and how the meanings of such texts are 
unstable strategies of persuasion that are always open to transformation, 
fragmentation and/or subversion. Many critics use such theories to argue 
that popular culture should receive the same scholarly respect and attention 
as elite "high culture" and that popular culture may have significant poten-
tial to transform or subvert dominant structures of power.3 Many of these 
critics—though not all of them—highlight the relationships between 
poststructuralist instabilities in meaning and larger historical and political 
situations. Often they draw on neo-Gramscian theory; they interpret strat-
egies of persuasion in cultural texts as part of an open-ended struggle for 
cultural hegemony. Discursive strategies are seen as part of a battle over 
who defines what is considered "reality" in any given historical situation, 
and this battle is analyzed as part of larger struggles for power.4 In com-
mon usage, "postmodern" criticism of popular culture tends to imply some 
variation on poststructuralist approaches and/or theories of cultural hege-
mony. The ideal type of "postmodern" critic, as I will use the term here, 
blends both approaches. 
Postmodern popular culture theories offer valuable resources for under-
standing popular religion in the United States—including that of Jerry 
Falwell and other conservative evangelicals—just as they do for analyzing 
secular mass communications. There is no doubt that conservative 
evangelicals are a significant cultural force in the contemporary United 
States, that many people within the broader mosaic of evangelicalism are 
self-consciously engaged in cultural-political contestation, and that religious 
popular culture is being mobilized as a resource and weapon in this 
struggle.5 Furthermore, a major issue for evangelicals is contestation over 
the interpretation of a text (the Bible) that has great power to constitute 
reality for those who live within its symbolic world.6 (Of course Falwell 
interprets this case of instability in textual interpretation as the unfortunate 
result of human sin; he clearly perceives contestation, but for him the 
contest is between the "literal meaning" of the Bible—his reading—and 
error.) 
These general considerations lead to a further question: might evan-
gelical popular religion take the form of postmodern political resistance? 
Armed with postmodern popular culture theory, many critics have been 
64 
searching for instabilities in a dominant culture that scholars had earlier 
perceived as a firm structure of power, and for counter-hegemonic possi-
bilities in cultural practices that had earlier seemed apolitical, marginal or 
so compromised that they hardly counted as relevant opposition.7 These 
critics have not only highlighted the oppositional potential of texts like 
rock music and film noir, but have also explored the counter-hegemonic 
possibilities of cultural practices that appear to be quite unpromising sites 
of opposition. For example, one critic discovered a proto-feminist con-
sciousness among consumers of romance novels; despite the genre's gender 
stereotypes and frequent rape scenes, she argued that readers could identify 
with self-assertive heroines overcoming obstacles and could use their own 
reading as a way to assert their personal needs.8 Another often-cited book 
goes so far as to hold out heroin addiction as an oppositional cultural style 
allied to black power.9 If even such extreme cases include some untapped 
potential for opposition, the counter-hegemonic potential of conservative 
evangelicalism seems well worth investigating. However, relatively few 
scholars have pursued this line of thought; most religious scholars who 
have explored oppositional popular religion have focused on religious prac-
tices linked to overtly radical and politicized interpretations of Christianity 
such as Latin American liberation theology and forms of Afro-American 
religion.10 Only a handful have explored the oppositional potential of 
mainstream evangelicalism in the United States.11 
Harvey Cox, the theologian and critic quoted above, is one of the 
most influential among this select few. His bestseller, Religion in the 
Secular City, provides an excellent point of departure for assessing the 
potential of evangelical opposition. Cox's pioneering pursuit of this ques-
tion has developed central insights that are important, indeed exemplary in 
relation to much of the literature. This article is intended as constructive 
work in a similar vein. His agenda is to search for and promote counter-
hegemonic movements rooted in evangelicalism, as suggested by his call 
for a liberation theology drawing on Baptist and Methodist folk piety. 
This idea may have important consequences for thinking about religion and 
social change in the United States, and it is surprising how few of the 
existing critical commentaries on Cox's book have stressed its impor-
tance.12 
Unfortunately, Cox weakens his larger argument through two theoreti-
cal distortions, both of which he inherited from and shares with much 
scholarship on evangelicalism. First, in his general treatment of the rela-
tionship between conservative evangelicals and modernity, he overestimates 
and overgeneralizés about evangelical resistance to modernity. He presents 
Jerry Falwell, his prototypical conservative evangelical, as a variant of 
"postmodern theology,"—a much stronger move than merely presenting a 
reading of Falwell's message informed by postmodern critical tools or 
merely highlighting the "postmodern" potential of parts of FalwelPs mes-
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sage. In short, he draws overly general conclusions from aspects of 
Falwell's message that resist modernity, and downplays crucial aspects of 
FalwelTs thought and practice that are in harmony with modernity. 
The second theoretical distortion is an overemphasis on the power of 
mass media to neutralize or trivialize evangelical opposition to hegemonic 
culture. After excessive stress on the general opposition between conser-
vative evangelicals and modernity, Cox's discussion of religious television 
swings the pendulum too far in the opposite direction. He argues that 
because a person like Jerry Falwell uses television, he and his constituency 
cannot be oppositional. His theories do not consider the possibility of 
evangelicals' television messages being unstable in meaning and open to a 
variety of interpretations. 
In relation to both modernity and mass media, Cox uses theories that 
are too sweeping. They distract from a focus on complexity, diversity and 
contestation within the world of conservative evangelicalism—a focus that 
is not only needed for clarity of understanding, but is precisely what Cox 
needs to highlight to advance his larger goal of North American liberation 
theology. This paper proposes to refine constructively Cox's analytical 
approach for the benefit of future studies expanding on his insights. 
Evangelicalism and Modernity 
in Religion in the Secular City 
It is important to stress that I am considering Cox's recent book, 
Religion in the Secular City: Toward a Postmodern Theology, because 
Cox's views have changed considerably over the years. For twenty-five 
years he has addressed and helped to shape trends in social thought among 
mainline Protestants.13 He is most famous for his 1965 best-seller The 
Secular City: Secularization and Urbanization in Theological Perspective, 
which presented secularization and liberal reform as the most appropriate 
contemporary forms of Biblical religion.14 In harmony with the broader 
trend of postmodern hostility toward liberal modernity, Religion in the 
Secular City turns the 1965 argument upside down. Whereas The Secular 
City proposed a "secular theology" that accommodated to the perceived 
virtues of modern urban society, Religion in the Secular City advocates a 
"postmodern theology" that resists a failing project of modernity and takes 
its moral stand with those "outside the gates" of modernity. 
We should begin by specifying Cox's definition of modernity, since, 
as he notes, this word is used in many ways which are sometimes contra-
dictory. Cox defines modernity through its "five pillars": a world political 
system based on nation-states, the power of science-based technology, 
bureaucratic rationalization as the mode of organization, profit maximiza-
tion as the means of motivating work and distributing goods, and "the 
secularization and trivialization of religion."15 For Cox, these themes 
come together in a relatively unified vision of technocratic corporate capi-
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talism on an international scale, coupled with an apolitical form of religion 
and spirituality. 
Cox argues that modern liberal theology, the way of thinking about 
religion that became dominant in the so-called "mainline" denominations, 
was born through "the gelding of God." As he tells the story, religious 
leaders were allowed by a newly ascendant and anti-clerical bourgeoisie to 
keep a limited part of their traditional privileges, but only at a high price. 
First, religious liberals tacitly agreed to limit their religious efforts to the 
private and spiritual realms, thus taking the political economy of modernity 
for granted. And second, they addressed their theology to the "cultured 
despisers" of religion rather than the people who were victims of the 
modern system; they elaborated a modern and "enlightened" interpretation 
of the Christian tradition and tried to defend it in the terms set forth by 
the dominant culture of the Enlightenment. The essence of postmodern 
theology, for Cox, is a "rupture" with this twofold arrangement. 
Postmodern theology makes pointed critiques of the political and economic 
status quo, and it addresses itself to the victims of this status quo. Indeed 
Cox hopes it will become a voice with the victims and of them, not 
merely addressed to them.16 
Cox's first conceptual problem arises from his interpretation of conser-
vative evangelicalism's historical development, which he explains primarily 
through evangelical resistance to modernity. The basic structure of his 
book presents Falwell's fundamentalism and Latin American liberation 
theology as two variations of religion that are opposed to modernity. By 
the end of the book he has rejected Falwell's type of "postmodernism," 
endorsed the Latin Americans' version, and called for a North American 
liberation theology. But in order to present Falwell in this context he 
must engage a vigorous debate that has been going on among historians of 
North American religion over the past few years: is it better to stress 
conservative Protestants as reacting against and resisting modernity, or as 
a historical development unfolding hand in hand with modernity?17 The 
choices are not mutually exclusive, since there is important evidence sup-
porting both sides of this argument; rather, the issue is which note to 
emphasize as an interpretive paradigm. Cox clearly leans toward the "re-
sistance" interpretation; unfortunately this is the side that has been losing 
the debate, with especially severe setbacks on issues that are central to 
Cox's argument. 
To understand this debate requires a short excursus into a terrain that 
is foreign to many scholars of United States culture: religious historiogra-
phy as a form of contestation over internal church politics. Most parties 
to this debate, including Cox, are addressing the unexpected growth of 
conservative evangelical numbers and prestige over the past few decades, 
which stands in sharp contrast with stagnation in "mainline" Protestant 
growth and prestige since the 1960s.18 Recently the "evangelicalism as 
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resistance to modernity" argument has been advanced most vigorously— 
though not exclusively—by scholars sympathetic to conservative and neo-
conservative agendas for responding to this situation. 
According to conservative versions of this argument, the key dynamic 
of conservative evangelicalism is resistance to liberal ways of thinking and 
organizing society. The growing power and influence of conservative 
Protestantism over the past few decades is seen to result from virtuous 
evangelical opposition to a bankrupt "liberalism" in general, and to the 
perceived moral vacuousness and anarchy of the 1960s in particular. The 
post 1960s stagnation of liberal Protestantism is blamed on a failure to 
"resist modernity" in an analogous way, and Cox's earlier Secular City is 
often cited as an especially reprehensible example of this failure. Conser-
vative commentators often use this line of thinking to celebrate aspects of 
the conservative Protestant success and to call for the mainline denomina-
tions to stop their stagnation by becoming more like the religious right, or 
at least to move closer to neo-conservatism.19 Sometimes this approach— 
not to be confused with Cox's—also calls itself "postmodern theology."20 
Not all scholars who lean toward a "resistance to modernity" analysis 
of conservative Protestant growth endorse the conclusions that conservative 
commentators draw from it. There is a sense in which conservatives have 
a "purchase" on the argument, like Republicans who have made the flag 
of the United States "their" symbolic property. But many scholars who 
are not conservatives accept the basic interpretation—evangelical resur-
gence based on resistance to modernity—and go on to deplore the resur-
gence as intolerant, ethnocentric, sexist, nostalgic or otherwise misguided. 
The majority of debates in religious historiography about evangelical 
growth are struggles between such liberal applications of the theory and 
the conservative versions described above. Cox also rejects celebratory 
conservative applications of the resistance logic, but his strategy is to give 
such logic a radical twist. He presents evangelical growth less as a con-
servative reaction against oppositional movements of the 1960s, and more 
as "postmodern." By this he certainly means "rebellious" and "opposed to 
the establishment." And given his definition of the modern status quo 
which stresses corporate capitalism, "postmodern" also seems to imply a 
reaction (actual or potential) against dominant capitalist structures. 
Meanwhile, unfortunately for this aspect of Cox's argument, leading 
scholars have increasingly used an alternative logic of interpretation—con-
servative Protestantism and modernity as complementary rather than oppo-
sitional—to critique and qualify "resistance" arguments. George Marsden, 
the most influential historian of fundamentalism, has increasingly empha-
sized how conservative Protestantism has shared—not resisted—attributes 
of modern dominant culture of the United States. He highlights 
evangelicals' individualistic, experiential and democratic sensibilities, as 
well as their eager and skillful use of mass communications. And he 
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takes pains to defend the legitimacy and thoughtfulness of evangelical 
scholarship, judged by common intellectual standards. This interpretive 
logic based on accommodation is combined, in Marsden's nuanced schol-
arship, with more conventional arguments about evangelical resistance to 
modernity—especially to twentieth-century manifestations of secular mo-
dernity.21 But a growing minority of religious historians have begun to 
move the "accommodationist" aspects of evangelicalism to the center of 
their interpretations—especially when considering the recent evangelical 
resurgence that is Cox's special concern. From this point of view 
evangelicalism "is best understood not as a negative reaction to, but as an 
integral part of, the modernization process."22 Thus the main theme of 
recent evangelical history is not resistance to the "moral anarchy of the 
1960s" but accommodation to individualism, capitalism, nationalistic pa-
triotism and so on. 
This logic of interpretation is more illuminating than the more com-
mon logic based on evangelicals resisting modernity—but to admit this is 
to undercut Cox's presentation. It means that his argument is built on an 
unnecessarily weak analytical foundation. Cox's foundation is weakest 
where he needs it to be the strongest: on the central issue of Falwell's 
opposition, or lack of it, to technocratic corporate capitalism. But through-
out the book Cox's assumptions about Falwell's resistance to modernity 
create ambiguities and analyses that may be misleading. For example, 
Cox follows the more familiar "resistance" logic when he distinguishes a 
rebellious "postmodern" Falwell from more moderate, modern Protestants 
on the grounds that moderates are more willing to dialog with broader 
society and engage in social action.23 But surely by this definition Falwell 
should be considered quite moderate. Indeed, in many ways the Moral 
Majority was a politically conservative and Southern variation on a reli-
gious tradition that was known in its politically liberal and Northern guise 
as the Social Gospel—the movement often cited as the classic example of 
Protestantism "accommodating" to modernity.24 
Cox may not be severely troubled by this, given the overall goals of 
his argument Remember that he proposes not only to study fundamental-
ism as "postmodern," but also to criticize Falwell's fundamentalism, show-
ing that it is a less useful source for postmodern theology than liberation 
theologies. He makes two kinds of criticisms. First, he makes the nor-
mative judgment that Falwell is unacceptably anti-pluralistic and apocalyp-
tic. This is consistent with the idea of Falwell as postmodern in Cox's 
sense.25 Second, Cox leans heavily on a criticism that stresses Falwell's 
accommodation to consumer capitalism through his use of mass media. 
In this second sense Cox in effect argues—ironically in light of his 
overall argument—that fundamentalism is an inadequate form of 
postmodern theology because it is not really postmodern, at least in this 
important respect But if so, should Cox present Falwell as a rebel against 
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modernity in the first place? More important, are there grounds for hoping 
that evangelical groups espousing North American liberation theology are 
likely to develop in the future? Cox's argument continually ties itself in 
knots: his underlying logic presents Falwell's fundamentalism as virtuous 
resistance to the modern, even though one of his major goals is to reject 
fundamentalism because of its accommodation to modernity. He looks to 
fundamentalism for possible future resistance to modernity, only to dis-
cover practices that may tie fundamentalists to modernity. 
In many ways this conceptual problem simply reflects the 
multivocality of religion and the complexity of experience in contemporary 
society; conservative evangelicalism has contradictory aspects, especially 
when considered as a movement of diverse people who have transformed 
themselves across history. But this very complexity suggests that words 
like "accommodation" and "resistance" cannot be used as total orientations 
to life. It is much more productive and true to experience to stress 
multiple layers, or aspects, of experience. Rather than ask whether funda-
mentalists mainly accommodate or resist a unified culture, we need to 
place more specific questions at the center of attention: "Accommodation 
to what specific aspect of culture?" "Resistance to what in particular?" 
For example, fundamentalists may resist abortion at the same time as they 
accommodate wholeheartedly to capitalism, imperialism or racism. Again, 
their apocalyptic attitude may lead them toward ahistorical thoughts on 
Sunday and militant political action on Monday—or militant rhetoric on 
Sunday and passive lifestyles on Monday.26 The point is to specify what 
kinds of resistance, in what circumstances, are under consideration. Only 
when we specify which aspects of society are in view can claims about 
accommodation or resistance to them be made with conceptual clarity. 
Cox is moving toward this kind of framework when he presents a 
generally resistant "postmodern" Falwell who is also an accommodated 
"modern" consumerisL But by making this framework clearer and more 
explicit Cox's analysis could be strengthened, and some of its ambiguities 
clarified. However, such an approach would also tend to undermine Cox's 
theme of conservative evangelicalism as a form of anti-modernism. Jerry 
Falwell does preach about resisting secular liberalism and participates in a 
historical movement that resists aspects of modernity. He is also a uni-
versity president who controls a major institution of mass media and has 
very powerful allies among government and business elites. His rhetoric 
critiques aspects of United States society yet also supports the same soci-
ety. He articulates certain problems of his constituency yet his main 
solution is individual prayer and monetary contributions to allow him to 
broadcast more television shows, as well as (recently muted) efforts to 
mobilize people for both "moral reform" and the support of capitalism and 
nationalism.27 As Cox would certainly agree, such complexity cannot be 
illuminated with single words like "resistance," "accommodation" and 
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"postmodernism." But given Cox's definition of modernity, we might 
surmise that FalwelTs general embrace of the "five pillars of modernity" 
would be the first point for Cox to stress, rather than FalwelTs resistance 
to certain trends in theology and social morality. However, since Cox has 
begun by presenting conservative evangelicalism primarily as a movement 
reacting against the dominant culture of the United States, his overall ar-
gument is unnecessarily distorted: he has difficulty highlighting FalwelTs 
attempts to accommodate people to United States nationalism, capitalism 
or imperialism. 
Televangelism and Cultural Contestation 
Over Evangelicalism 
My argument thus far provides little encouragement for cultural critics 
exploring the oppositional potential of conservative evangelicalism. How-
ever, just as we must answer the question, "resistance to what aspects of 
modernity?" we must ask "resistance by whom, and in whose interest?" In 
other words, we must clearly understand that Jerry Falwell is not the only 
historical subject within the highly diverse world of conservative Protes-
tantism. Cox treats Falwell as his representative of "redneck religion." 
But there are major differences between Jerry Falwell, the television star 
and politician, and his various working-class followers whom Cox (follow-
ing Falwell) describes as "rednecks."28 And this is only the beginning of 
the full complexity and diversity of evangelicalism that has been stressed 
in recent literature.29 White working-class Baptists and a very wide array 
of other evangelicals who hear Falwell are free to draw their own conclu-
sions for their own purposes, which will often diverge from FalwelTs. 
They can accept what they find helpful from FalwelTs anti-establishment 
rhetoric, and reject the rest Presumably Cox hopes for something like this 
when he advocates liberation theologies rooted in evangelical folk piety. 
But again, Cox's theoretical presuppositions significantly undermine 
his better insights. At this point in Cox's argument, his pendulum swings 
from excessive optimism about FalwelTs general "postmodern" resistance 
to an excessive pessimism about any opposition coming from a movement 
compromised by modern mass communication. For Cox, Latin American 
liberation theology is a promising form of postmodern opposition because 
the Latin Americans have organized themselves into small face to face 
groups called basic Christian communities, which Cox relates to 
Habermas' "communicative life-worlds."30 In contrast, conservative North 
American Protestants are tied to religious mass media. Cox sees this as a 
fatal flaw, an Achilles heel that ironically exposes Falwell as too accom-
modated to modernity and lacking in oppositional potential.31 
But such an argument can be misleading, even if we set aside the 
central issue of evangelical diversity and focus only on the smaller group 
of evangelicals who actually watch religious television.32 Cox does not 
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show why the political movement he desires must be organized through 
small face-to-face groups. Clearly there is a need for some form of human 
solidarity and communication. But Cox does not explain why one who 
watches religious television could not also participate in small groups (or 
large political movements) at other times of the week.33 He seems to rea-
son that since oppositional popular piety needs to be expressed through 
small groups, it cannot also be expressed through mass media. Since 
increasing numbers of evangelicals have been communicating through mass 
media over the past few decades, Cox sees tradition and resistance moving 
toward accommodation or trivialization. 
No doubt there is significant truth in this perception, and we will 
return to it. However, postmodern cultural criticism on Utopian hopes and 
mass communications raises critical questions about Cox's approach, even 
if we restrict our attention to conservative Protestants who do watch reli-
gious television and don't supplement it with other activities. For ex-
ample, Fredric Jameson addresses roughly the same problem that troubles 
Cox: the possibility that mass communication might manipulate an audi-
ence so thoroughly that it is unable to form any alternative and indepen-
dent judgements.34 In such a case, mass culture would define "reality" for 
the audience, and hopes for organizing collective movements for change 
would disappear. Indeed collective identity would disappear, as defined 
apart from a faceless mass of individual consumers, brainwashed and paci-
fied by mass media. 
Such reasoning leads Cox (following Habermas) to search for opposi-
tion in small communities on the margins of dominant culture. But 
Jameson, like many other critics who work in a similar vein, refuses to 
despair about popular struggles in and through a world dominated by mass 
media. His argument starts from a simple observation: what a speaker in-
tends to say (the preferred reading of a text) is not always what is heard 
(the received meaning) and the conclusions preferred by speakers and lis-
teners may be in conflict. Like Cox, Jameson suspects the worst about the 
intentions of mass media producers and the marketing specialists who pay 
their salaries. But he insists that the preferred reading of any text—say 
the meaning of a television show as intended by the Coca-Cola company, 
which pays for it through advertising—is not necessarily the same as the 
meaning gained by the audience. 
Jameson argues that alternative readings are possible even in worst 
case scenarios: very persuasive mass media texts that seem to manipulate 
their audience so thoroughly that it can only respond by "buying the 
Coke." He argues that such texts could not be persuasive, and therefore 
successful in making the sale, if they did not appeal to some real needs 
and concerns of the audience. In this sense, the voice of the audience 
must be built into the meaning of the mass media text, even in the process 
of channeling and distorting the voice. For example, no one would care 
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about "things going better with Coke" if the commercial did not evoke 
more substantial "things" that needed to "go better." In this important 
sense, mass media keep collective needs and identities alive and continu-
ally feed desires for a better life. And audiences are free to use the parts 
of the text that appeal to them for whatever purposes they choose—they 
do not necessarily have to buy the Coke. 
Religious television provides an excellent case study for Jameson's 
theory. The shows are typically very explicit about the Utopian hopes they 
evoke, and very blatant in their attempts to channel viewers' desires to-
ward the goal of keeping the gospel message alive and on the air (through 
donations to the evangelist for future broadcasts.) Oral Roberts, for ex-
ample, begins and ends each show stating his goal: to help you "get your 
needs met" by God. The needs include not only inner peace, but also 
health, friendship and especially material success. He advocates "seed-
faith" gifts to his ministry, and presents them as investments that God will 
pay back spectacularly in the giver's material life. 
The point is not that Jameson would endorse everything—or any-
thing!—about religious television. It often encourages individualistic solu-
tions to problems, rather than the "drive toward collectivity" posited by 
Jameson.35 And he, like Cox, would perceive the collective solutions 
suggested by televangelists as highly dubious and often dangerous. Yet at 
the very least, religious television must evoke the audiences' Utopian 
hopes, thus helping to keep them alive in a muted form. And unless we 
assume that viewers of religious television always accept the interpretations 
preferred by the broadcasters, we can explore the audiences' potential to 
use the Utopian hopes evoked by the broadcast in their own way: that is, 
for their own ends, which may conflict with those preferred by the 
televangelists. 
Is this mere abstract speculation? We are speaking of potentialities 
that may or may not be realized, especially in an oppositional form. 
However, we know that the preferred and received meanings of ordinary 
sermons can come into conflict, and that in the past such conflicts have 
sometimes been important for opposition. For example, some antebellum 
white evangelists hoped to pacify slaves by preaching to them about the 
spiritual equality of blacks and whites. Such a message could be received 
in the preferred way, as an argument for obedience on earth and a reward 
in heaven. But it could also be received as a hypocritical joke and an 
invitation to a future revolt to equalize things more concretely on earth, 
legitimated by a radical Afro-American reading of Christianity.36 If ordi-
nary sermons are open to diverse readings, perhaps television sermons are 
not different in principle. 
Of course it would be foolish to deny that religious television often 
broadcasts false and misleading information and succeeds in channeling 
Utopian aspirations toward ends that can hardly be described as opposi-
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tional. In this regard televangelism is a particularly sharp reminder of the 
limits to Jameson's theory. The opposition he identifies is always limited 
because it deals with contested meanings; it is the product of an interplay 
between elite preferred readings and non-elite received meanings, which 
frequently takes place on a cultural terrain chosen by the elites. The 
theory allows critics to identify oppositional possibilities virtually any-
where; however, the compromises that are involved are not the same ev-
erywhere. For example, it is easier to identify counter-hegemonic possi-
bilities in film noir than in FalwelTs Old Time Gospel Hour, just as rap 
music makes more sense as an oppositional cultural style than heroin 
addiction does. To lump all these cases together because they evoke and 
channel Utopian desires is to risk making opposition an inescapable net— 
the mirror image of the theories that present commercial mass media as a 
net smothering all opposition. 
The only way to avoid this net of inescapable opposition is to set 
some kind of standards—to introduce distinctions between forms of oppo-
sition that appear more or less promising, based on some specified criteria. 
But this is a touchy subject for postmodern popular culture theory, for 
both general and specific reasons. In general, postmodern critics have 
gone to great lengths to avoid the tendency of modern liberal culture to 
impose purportedly "universal" standards on others. And postmodern crit-
ics who are specifically concerned with popular culture are especially sus-
picious of appeals to external standards, because such appeals have often 
been used to dismiss the indirect oppositional potential of popular culture. 
For example, skeptics asked how rock music could be considered promis-
ing for opposition by the standards of "real" political opposition. 
Postmodern critics replied, "Only by broadening the previous 'common 
sense' definition of what kinds of opposition are relevant and important." 
Is it appropriate to set standards that would judge televangelism, or 
evangelical popular religion more generally, as a relatively unpromising 
place to look for opposition? Setting external standards to define "rel-
evant" opposition raises difficult problems of translation between different 
experiences of cultural "reality." It risks passing judgment on a given 
cultural practice by criteria that might seem inappropriate, insensitive or 
overtly oppressive from the point of view of people engaged in the prac-
tice "from the inside." In addition, external critics might be unable to 
perceive issues that are crucially important to insiders, perhaps even issues 
that will prove decisive for future opposition. For example, just as some 
external critics failed to see the importance of rock music for social 
change during the 1960s, some critics today may misunderstand current 
cultural practices—including some evangelical ones—because their theories 
about opposition limit what they are able to perceive. These problems 
with external standards suggest that postmodern cultural critics should 
avoid using external criteria that rule out the oppositional potential of 
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religious television. It may be important to give FalwelFs viewers the 
benefit of doubt, hoping that the play of Utopian ideas will be received and 
used according to the viewers' needs. 
However, some tentative standards that distinguish between promising 
and unpromising forms of opposition are necessary and desirable for set-
ting priorities and grounding a moral-political vision.37 From this point of 
view, Cox has strong arguments for criticizing televangelism, as well as 
many other aspects of conservative Protestantism. The religious right is 
anti-pluralistic, Cox says. And, in general, "the worst mistake we could 
make today would be to convince ourselves that the bad old days when 
the sacred could be misused are over, that the critical blade of modern 
theology can now be safely sheathed."38 In addition, Cox unabashedly 
favors social transformation in the interests of poor people and those who 
are oppressed because of race, sexuality or other reasons. Even though 
this is an external standard that runs the risk of imposing Cox's values and 
misperceiving other forms of opposition, it is defensible given the behavior 
and goals of many conservative evangelicals.39 Given his moral-political 
commitments, Cox judges the base communities of liberation theology as 
a better model of religious opposition, and a more promising coalition 
partner, than televangelists. The choice is fairly clear-cut between, say, 
Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network and the religious contribu-
tion to popular organizing in El Salvador. 
The upshot of this discussion of evangelicals and the media is com-
plex. On one hand, Cox has good arguments for suggesting that the 
prospects for evangelical opposition are relatively weak, although this 
weakness is less the result of televangelism than a general by-product of 
evangelical accommodation to dominant culture. On the other hand, 
postmodern cultural theorists like Jameson provide strong arguments 
against ruling out the possibility of significant evangelical opposition, even 
in very unpromising cultural arenas such as televangelism. Jameson's 
arguments are important because Cox and other cultural critics who hope 
for social transformation must work with the raw materials that our culture 
gives them at a given time; they gain little by complaining, for example, 
that the United States is not Latin America, or that Pat Robertson has 
more money to buy television time than Daniel Berrigan. 
In addition, postmodern cultural theory highlights how the residual 
power of religious traditions can be expressed and contested—not merely 
defeated and trivialized—within a society that communicates through com-
mercial mass media. José Limon has shown how the oppositional hopes 
identified by Jameson are current manifestations of long-lasting historical 
traditions, often religious, that are shared by groups of people.40 From this 
point of view it becomes obvious that keeping these traditions alive, even 
in quite twisted forms, may be very important for future opposition. 
Evangelicalism provides a complex matrix of ideas and values that can be 
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used in many different ways. Evangelicals read the same Bible as 
liberationists, and evangelical history includes not only Ku Klux Klan lead-
ers, male supremacists and anti-communists, but also civil rights marchers, 
left wing populists, anti-imperialists and feminists.41 Evangelicals who 
stress apocalyptic prophecies of the endtimes have identified elite policies 
in the United States with both God's will and with "Babylon," and such 
ideas have been linked to political stances along the full spectrum from 
passivity and alienation to reformist activism and violent revolt.42 The 
evangelical tradition includes both Oral Roberts whose version of religious 
conversion promises that "God can turn it around for you," and Martin 
Luther King, Jr., who says "America, you must be born again. . . your 
whole structure must be changed."43 
In other words, postmodern cultural theory suggests the value of 
refocusing Cox's analysis of evangelical opposition and its relation to mass 
media.44 The most important question is not whether evangelicals evade 
the influence of televangelism, even though its largely conservative impact 
is real and important. Rather, the central issue is contestation between 
various interpretations of religious popular culture, not only among people 
uninfluenced by televangelism, but also within televangelism and across the 
whole spectrum of religious experience. Strong historical traditions exist 
that provide resources for oppositional popular religion, and critics should 
not completely dismiss their potential influence even in very unpromising 
arenas like Falwell's Old Time Gospel Hour. 
If the issue is framed in this way, additional questions about the 
oppositional potential of evangelicalism come into view. Under what 
conditions do oppositional versions of religious traditions blossom and 
flower, and when do they subsist as more muted and submerged potenti-
alities? Beyond this, when do the Utopian aspects of religious traditions 
function as something more than unfulfilled hopes for a better life? Do 
they always play a role that a neo-Gramscian might call a "rehearsal for 
revolution" and a preacher might symbolize as a "foretaste of the Kingdom 
of God?" What is their relationship to actualized revolutionary movements 
or religious activists who seek concrete answers to their prayer, "God's 
will be done, on earth as it is in heaven"? Perhaps most importantly, how 
should we relate all these abstract questions to empirical studies of particu-
lar people in the contemporary United States? 
These questions cannot be answered in a short essay; indeed the an-
swers that emerge will depend partly on collective interaction and organi-
zation in the future. But the questions lead back to the issue that intro-
duced this paper: granted that popular religion is a site of cultural contes-
tation, what are the prospects for versions of liberation theology rooted in 
mainstream popular evangelicalism? The above analysis of Cox helps 
conceptualize this problem more clearly. Negatively, we should not as-
sume that the conservative evangelical establishment is primarily opposi-
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tional toward the aspects of our society that Cox defines as modern. Nor 
should we assume that televangelism automatically neutralizes all religious 
opposition. Positively, we should conceive of religious opposition in re-
lation to particular activities of historically specific people in a complex 
society; and we should remember that religious traditions, even within 
postmodern mass culture, can provide powerful resources for imagining 
and ultimately organizing change. Thus Cox is insightful when he sug-
gests that there are significant resources for liberation theologies within 
mainstream popular evangelicalism, and his argument can be strengthened 
through the theoretical refinements I have suggested. There is ongoing 
contestation over the meaning of evangelical popular religion and its rela-
tion to hegemonic power. The question is who will win this contest. 
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